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CONDITIONAL DELIVERY OF A DEED TO THE GRANTEE
An issue that frequently confronts the courts in litigation involving
transfers of land is whether or not there has been a delivery of the
deed. To further complicate matters, grantors, either by necessity or
inclination, often attempt to render the legal effectiveness of their
deeds dependent upon the occurrence of some event not mentioned
in the deed itself. Usually the grantor who wishes to postpone or
condition the full legal effect of his deed by an event not mentioned
in the deed itself, will transfer the instrument to someone other than
the grantee. This third person will hold the instrument until the event
has occurred, or the specified condition has been performed. An ar-
rangement such as this is commonly called a delivery in escrow. It
frequently happens, however, that the grantor will transfer a deed to
the grantee and attempt to condition the deed's effectiveness in some
way. What is the legal result of this act when the condition is oral?
This note will attempt to supply the answer.
In considering this topic it will be helpful to recall the usual re-
quirements that must be observed when transferring land. Ordinarily,
all conveyances of freehold or leasehold interests in land must be in
writing in order to comply with the Statute of Frauds. The deed is the
instrument that satisfies this requirement.1 In order for the deed to
be legally effective there are two requirements that must be met;
execution and delivery. The former may include signing, sealing, at-
testing, and acknowledging the instrument, depending on the juris-
diction in which the deed was executed. 2 These are necessary in order
to make the deed legally effective by delivery. The delivery phase
will be discussed more fully than execution in order to provide a
basis for understanding the more specialized problem of conditional
delivery.
The requirement that there be delivery of a deed before it can
become legally operative is one of ancient origin. Whether its in-
ception be attributed to livery of seisin or the manual transfer of writ-
ten documents, the transfer served the same function.3 The transfer
of the document or the piece of sod, as was done in the case of livery
of seisin, symbolized a transfer of the land itself. The requirement of
manual transfer of the document representing title came to us as the
E.g., Ky. RBv. STAT. sec. 382.010, 1948; 4 TxrrANr, REAL. PRoEnTy see.
966 (3rd Ed. 1939).
23 A_&macA_ LAw oF PNonRTY 301 (1952).
34 TirrANY, op. cit. supra note 1, sec. 1033; 9 WiGMo1E, EvmENcE sec. 2405
(3rd ed. 1940).
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symbol of finality in conveying interests in land.4 Without manual
transfer, the deed would be inoperative. This primitive approach has
now been abandoned and the question of delivery is generally one of
intention.5 Delivery takes place if it appears that the grantor intended
that the deed should become legally operative, and that he abandoned
dominion and control over it, even though he retained possession of
the instrument.6 Conversely, the deed may be placed in the hands of
the grantee without passing title, if there is no intention that title shall
pass. 7 To the extent that the term delivery conveys the impression
that a deed must be manually transferred, it is misleading. The modem
approach is to use the term delivery in the sense of a completed legal
act and not a physical one.
Delivery, used in the sense of a legal act, may be classified as
either absolute or conditional. When the grantor manifests an in-
tention that his deed shall become operative immediately to transfer
the ownership of the land, and that he is abandoning all dominion
and control over it, the delivery may be properly classified as absolute.
On the other hand, when the deed is delivered "with strings attached"
the delivery is conditional. To be more specific about this latter trans-
action the thoughts of the grantor may follow these lines: "I intend to
part with control over this deed and further intend that this instru-
ment shall have some legal effect, but I am suspending the conveyance
of the interest which this instrument purports to create until the con-
dition that is specified has been performed or a particular event has
occurred." Having formed this intention the grantor might do one of
two things. He may deliver the deed to a third person to be held by
him until the condition has been performed or the event has occurred.
This is the so-called delivery in escrow, already mentioned. When the
grantor chooses this method of furthering his designs he is generally
successful.8 However, if he attempts to effect his intention by delivery
' 9 WsmcorE, op. cit. supra note 3, sec. 2405.
'4 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 1, sec. 1034.
0 26 C.J.S. 233 (1941); The essentials of a valid delivery are set fourth in
Noffsinger v. Noffsinger, 303 Ky. 344, 197 S.W. 2nd 785, 786 (1946). "It is an
elementary principle that a deed must be delivered in order to become operative
as a transfer of the ownership of the land, but manual delivery by the grantor
to the grantee is not essential . . It may be delivered to a third person with
intention that the grantee shall have the benefit of the deed or it may be
retained by the grantor and delivery be consummated if the grantor expresses
an intention that the title shall pass and indicates by acts or words that he is
holding the instrument for the benefit of the grantee. The controlling factor is
the intention to make delivery, and this intention may be inferred from the
grantor's acts and words and from the circumstances surrounding the execution
of the instrument."
7 Elrod v. Schroader, 261 Ky. 491, 88 S.W. 2d 12 (1935); 4 TIFFANY, op. cit.
supra note 1, sec. 1034. 830 C.J.S. 1208 (1942).
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to the grantee, the result may be frustration instead of fulfillment.
This is the situation that will be examined in detail, keeping in mind
that the deed is absolute on its face, but the condition oral.
It is the prevailing view in this country that delivery to a grantee
of a deed absolute on its face vests title in the grantee although the
grantor wishes to postpone the operative effect of his deed by an
oral condition.9 There is, however, authority contrary to the majority
position,10 and the trend would seem to be toward allowing the grantor
to prove the oral condition upon which delivery is made." In some
cases courts will conclude that a delivery, although appearing to be
conditional, is actually no delivery at all, 12 thereby avoiding the issue
of conditional delivery to the grantee.
The majority rule rests basically on three grounds, excluding the
possible variations. First of all is stare decisis.13 Secondly, there is
the familiar cry that to allow proof of oral conditions would open the
door to fraud and encourage the fabrication of evidence. 14 The run-
ning mate of this reason is the argument that there would be no safety
in accepting a deed under most circumstances. 1 Thirdly, there is the
parol evidence doctrine that forbids the admission of oral evidence to
vary or alter the terms of a written instrument, Are these reasons
sufficient to permit a positive rule of law to overcome the intentions of
the grantor? An analysis of the various reasons demonstrates that the
answer to this question is no.
The first reason mentioned was stare decisis. Of course this is a
valid ground for making a decision, but it is by no means compelling.
This is particularly true in this instance when it is recalled that the
general requirement for manual transfer of a deed grew out of the
primitive respect for overt acts. It would not be fair, however, to the
'Collins v. Dye, 94 F. 2d 799 (9th. cir. 1938); Wells v. Wells, 252 Ala. 390,
41 So. 2d 564 (1949); Takacs v. Takacs, 317 Mich. 72, 26 N.W. 2d 712 (1947);
In re Humes's Estate, 272 P. 2d 999 (Mont. 1954); 11 A.L.R. 1174 (1921); 26
C.J.S. 251 (1941); 4 TiFFANY, op. cit. supra note 1, see. 1049.
"Chillemi v. Chillemi, 197 Md. 257, 78 A. 2d 750 (1951); Tanksley v.
Tanksley, 145 Tenn. 468, 239 S.W. 766 (1922); Burt v. Burt, 116 Utah 188, 209
P. 2d 217 (1949).
"As an indication of the trend toward the minority view it is significant that
conditional delivery to the obligee has been recognized in cases involving writter
contracts and negotiable instruments. See 11 A.L.R. 1174 (1921); BnrrroN, BiLS
AND NOTES 214 (1943); Ballantine, Delivery in Escrow and the Parol Evidenc
Rule, 29 YALE L.J. 826, 833 (1920).
See 9 WIGI OI E, op. cit. supra note 3, at 25 n. 12.
"See Chillemi v. Chillemi, supra note 10, 78 A. 2nd at 753.
"Sweeney v. Sweeney, 126 Conn. 391, 11 A. 2nd 806, 808 (1940); Loughrai
v. Kummer, 297 Pa. 179, 146 AUt. 534, 535 (1925).
"Ibid.
"J. M. Iobinson, Norton & Co. v. Randall, 147 Ky. 45, 48, 143 S.W. 76S
770 (1912); Takas v. Takas, supra note 9, 26 N.W. 2d at 717.
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courts that follow this rule to say that they concur in the primitive
reverence for the symbolic act, because most courts do recognize that
the controlling factor is the intent of the grantor when the issue is
whether or not there has been an absolute delivery.' 7
To say the majority rule must stand because any other position
would open the door to fraud involves a patent inconsistency. A deed
may be banded to a grantee without effecting any delivery whatsoever.
Why cannot the instrument be transferred to the grantee without
effecting more than a conditional delivery? It is submitted that there
is no valid answer.
The remaining objection to adoption of the minority view is the
parol evidence rule. This objection seems untenable when it is remem-
bered that a transfer of land cannot be accomplished merely by execu-
tion of a deed. A deed's effectiveness to transfer land is dependent
upon delivery. This is a matter in pais and cannot be shown in the
deed itself.'8 Delivery is the second and final step in making the deed
legally operative, and proof of delivery or lack of it, when absolute
delivery is in issue, must constantly be made by parol evidence.19
Similarly, there is no reason why a conditional delivery cannot be
shown by oral evidence, since there is no intent that the deed is to
become legally operative until the performance or occurrence of the
specified condition.2 0 Of course it must be recognized that there is a
strong policy against having conveyances of land rest any more than
is necessary on parol evidence. Against this policy, however, is the
equally compelling one that a person should be free to dispose of his
property under such reasonable conditions as he may wish to impose.
Delivery of a deed to a grantee under an oral condition does not seem
to be so unreasonable that courts should frustrate the grantor's wishes.
By considering several Kentucky cases, other important topics con-
nected with the problem of conditional delivery may be illustrated.
The additional problems to be raised are: (1) conditional delivery
where there is an oral stipulation that the deed shall become opera-
tive only in the event the grantor predeceases the grantee and (2) the
distinction between a condition precedent and a condition subsequent.
Before focusing attention on these problems, the development of
the law concerning conditional delivery in Kentucky will be briefly
reviewed. As in most other states, the question of whether or not
there has been a delivery in a question of intention to be gleaned
"4 T n, Y, op. cit. supra note 1, sec. 1034.
Ballantine, supra note 11, at 826. 1 ibid.
See 9 WIGNMOE, op. cit. supra note 3, sec. 2408, where it is noted that the
rule preventing conditional delivery to the grantee is an arbitrary one.
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from the words or acts of the grantor.21 The issue of the conditional
delivery of an instrument relating to land first arose in connection
with a deed of mortgage.2 2 During foreclosure proceedings, one of
the signers of this mortgage alleged that the mortgagee orally agreed
that the mortgage would not be enforced against the signer unless
consent was obtained in writing. The Kentucky Court of Appeals dis-
posed of the problem handily by saying:
S.. If it [the oral agreement] was made at the time of the delivery
of the instrument, the sum of the matter is that the instrument was
delivered in escrow to the plaintiff [mortgagee] and was to be held
by the plaintiff upon the condition stated. But the rule is well settled
that an instrument can not be delivered as an escrow to the plaintiff.
The delivery must be to a third person.23
In conclusion the court said that to uphold such agreements would be
to allow parol evidence to destroy the effect of the instrument.
Kentucky was off to a fast start with the traditional rule. However,
the Kentucky Court of Appeals refused to extend this doctrine to a
case where the grantor handed a deed to the grantee merely for safe-
keeping.24 The court found that there was no intent to make even a
conditional delivery. This decision was undoubtedly correct and in
accord with the requirement that the manual transfer of the deed be
accompanied by an intent to pass title.
Apparently the first case in Kentucky involving the delivery of a
deed of land to the grantor with an oral condition attached was City
National Bank of Cairo, Illinois v. Anderson.25 The deed was trans-
ferred by the grantor to the grantee on condition that the deed should
not be recorded, and, upon failure of the grantee to pay the purchase
price when due or within a reasonable time, the deed and the land
should be surrendered to the grantor. The purchase price was never
paid and the deed was surrendered to the grantor. It was held that
the title to the land was vested in the grantee and the surrender of
the deed was insufficient to return the title to the grantor.
In the case of Hood v. Nichol,26 the court found it necessary to
consider the effect of a manual transfer of a deed to the grantee
where the intent of the parties to the instrument was that the deed
should not become operative as a conveyance unless the grantor
predeceased the grantee. The parties raising the issue contended that
I Noffsinger v. Noffsinger, supra note 6.
J. M. Robinson, Norton & Co. v. Randall, supra note 16.
Id. at 48, 143 S.W. at 770.
2'Ball v. Sandlin, 176 Ky. 537, 195 S.W. 1089 (1917).
189 Ky. 487, 225 S.W. 361 (1920).
-286 Ky. 779, 34 S.W. 2d 429 (1930).
NoTEs Aim Co~vmm rs
the transfer of the deed constituted a delivery in escrow which vested
title in the grantee. It was held that the grantor had not become
divested of the property by the execution and manual transfer of the
deed.
The basis of this decision is not clear. Was the decision based
upon a failure of delivery, or was it decided that a conditional
delivery could be made to the grantee without the condition being
ineffective? In one part of the opinion the language indicates that a
conditional delivery of a deed may be made to the grantee. After
citing a number of cases which the court says cannot be reconciled
with the traditional rule in the Anderson case, the court says the re-
sults of the cited cases,
. . . are uniformly to the effect that, if there be no intention of
presently passing the title, and if the intention is that title is not to
pass until something else be done or takes place, the manual transfer
of possession of a deed to the grantee will not constitute such a de-
livery as to vest title in the grantee.2 7 (Italics supplied by writer.)
Although the cases cited in the opinion turn on the question of
whether there has been a delivery of any type, the language of the
court indicates that a grantor may place a deed in the possession of
the grantee with the intention of postponing the passage of title "until
something else be done or takes place." This type of transaction is
what we have defined as a conditional delivery. Another indication
that the decision is based on the theory of a failure of the condition
that was to make the deed operative is the effort to distinguish this
case from the Anderson case.28 The condition in the Anderson case
was interpreted to be a type of defeasance or condition subsequent in
contrast to the condition precedent in the Hood case.
On the other hand, there is language in the opinion to the effect
that there had not been a delivery of any type. After stating the
argument in support of the rule that there can be no delivery in escrow
to a grantee, the court states:
i . . f the word 'delivery' in the statement of this proposition means
something more than the mere intrusting of the manual possession of
the instrument to the grantee without any intention of presently
passing the title, we have presented a different state of case than
that disclosed by this record. 29
This statement seemingly implies that the court considers the trans-
fer here to be little more than a transfer to the grantee for inspection
or safekeeping. The court evidently feels that the distinction between
" Id. at 800, 84 S.W. 2d at 488. ' Ibid.
'Id. at 801, 84 S.W. 2d at 488.
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delivery in escrow to the grantee and intrusting the manual possession
of the deed to the grantee is too fine to merit a practical difference. 30
After stating that no one would contend that intrusting a deed to the
grantee for the purpose of having it examined by his attorney would
be such a delivery as to pass title, the court says: "The reason, of
course, is that there is no intention of presently passing the title."3 '
Still referring to the situation where a deed is given to the grantee
for inspection and in answer to the argument of fraud that supports
the majority rule, the court continues:
. . .Where is the opportunity for fraud any greater or less in that
kind of a case than in the kind of case where the manual possession
of a deed is intrusted to the named grantee, but with no intention
of ever passing the title unless within a period which is hound at
some time to come to an end, a condition is fulfilled or not? ..Only in
the element of time ...
In spite of ambiguity, the cumulative effect of the language in the
Hood case indicates that the grantor may transfer a deed to the grantee
with an accompanying oral condition without vesting title in the
grantee until the condition has been satisfied.32 Disregarding the
language of the opinion, it must be recognized that many jurisdictions
have concluded that there was no delivery on facts similar to those in
the Hood case.33 The cases from other jurisdictions relied on in the
Hood case take that position.34 The rationalization of these cases
seems to rest on the theory that a deed transferred to the grantee on
condition that the grantor predecease the grantee is an attempt by the
grantor to make a testamentary disposition of the property. Since the
deed does not comply with the statutory requirements for wills, it is
ineffective for that purpose. Furthermore, since the grantor is attempt-
' See 1 WILLISTON, Com'NTRcrs see. 212 (Rev. ed. 1936).
' Supra note 26 at 801, 34 S.W. 2d at 488.
' This conclusion is supported by dictum in Ratelifls Guardian v. Ratcliff,
242 Ky. 419, 422, 46 S.W. 2d504, 506 (1932). After referring to the Hood case
the court stated: "But the circumstances indicated that there had been only a
conditional or contingent delivery, and it was held that title did not pass because
of the absence of an intention to presently pass the title." In Smith v. Feltner, 256
Ky. 325, 76 S.W. 2d 25 (1934) the grantor executed a deed in which his father
was named grantee. The deed was manually transferred but was not to be effec-
tive unless the grantor was convicted of a criminal charge for which he was going
on trial. He was not convicted and the court concluded that there had not been
an effective delivery of the deed. Although the facts would seem to support a
holding in accord with the writer's conclusion of the Hood case, the decision of
the court wasn't on the ground of conditional delivery. The court states that the
grantor did not surrender control of the instrument and this precludes rationaliz-
ing the decision on the basis of conditional delivery.
' Spero v. Bove, 70 A. 2d 562 (1950); 141 A.L.R. 305, 308 (1942); 56 A.L.R.
746, 749 (1922).
Supra note 26 at 800, 34 S.W. 2d at 438.
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ing to make a testamentary disposition of the property involved, he
does not have the requisite intent to make a valid present delivery.3 5
Therefore, there is no delivery whatsoever.
This conclusion appears logical, but a conclusion just as logical,
with the added feature of being in accord with the intention of the
grantor, may be reached if the problem is approached through the
concept of conditional delivery. If the grantor transfers a deed to the
grantee to convey title only in the event that the grantor dies before
the grantee, and the grantor parts with full dominion and control over
the deed, why not treat the transaction as a conditional delivery in-
stead of an attempted testamentary disposition? If the transaction is
in fact a conditional delivery, then the grantor has no right to revoke.
If the condition occurs, then the wishes of the grantor will be satis-
fied. If the condition does not occur, the deed is rendered inoperative
and the grantor is entitled to have the deed surrendered. 36 It seems
that the grantor in the Hood case was without power to revoke the
deed during his lifetime; therefore, no reason is apparent why this
reasoning is not applicable to the situation in that case.
The Hood case raised one other problem in connection with the
conditional delivery of deeds. The court characterized the condition
in the Anderson case as a condition subsequent thereby distinguishing
the case under consideration. Is this a valid distinction? It is sub-
mitted that it is. Of course the difficulty comes in determining whether
the condition is precedent or subsequent. Once that determination is
made, application of the legal theory is relatively simple.
There are at least two valid reasons for distinguishing between a
condition precedent and a condition subsequent. In a situation where
the condition is subsequent, the parol evidence rule is applicable. To
allow proof by parol of a condition qualifying the operation of a deed
which has been delivered and has become effective would result in the
alteration of the terms of the written obligation which is plainly what
the parol evidence rule seeks to prevent.37 The second reason is per-
haps more imperative. Assuming that the condition subsequent would
be of the same nature as that in the Anderson case, that the deed and
land would be surrendered if the grantee failed to pay the purchase
price, the condition could not operate to revest title in the grantor
once it had become vested in the grantee. It would be necessary for
E.g., Coles v. Belford, 289 Mo. 97, 232 S.W. 728 (1921); Chaudoir v. Witt,
170 WVis. 556, 170 N.W. 932 (1919).
" See Chillemi v. Chillemi, supra note 10, where the same explanation would
seem to apply.
' 9 VIGNIOREn op. cit. supra note 3, sec. 2435 (b).
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the grantee to execute and deliver a deed in order to accomplish such
a result.38
In the opinion of this writer there is no theoretical reason for
preventing a grantor from transferring a deed absolute on its face, to
a grantee, and attaching an oral condition precedent to the complete
effectiveness of the deed. Nor is there any substantial practical objec-
tion since manual possession of the deed carries with it a presumption
of delivery with intention of passing title.39 In Kentucky the rule is
apparently established that a grantor may make a conditional delivery
to the grantee.40 The term "apparently" is intended to be used with
all the uncertainty that the word can possibly connote. This note is
not an invitation to grantors in Kentucky to make conditional deliveries
of deeds to their grantees. As a practical matter, this practice is always
hazardous to a certain extent. However, if the Kentucky Court of
Appeals follows the principles laid down in the Hood case, such a
transaction would probably be upheld.
CmiL W. TuRam
McHargue v. McHargue, 269 Ky. 355, 107 S.W. 2d 278 (1937).
Hood v. Nichol, supra note 26 at 797, 34 S.W. 2d at 436.
'o Hood v. Nichol, supra note 26.
